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AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM: INHERENT RIGHT OR
CONGRESSIONAL LICENSE?
Frederick J. Martone*
Who or what is a sovereignty? What is his or its sovereignty? On
this subject, the errors and the mazes are endless and inexplicable.
Chisolm v. Georgia, 1 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456 (1793) (Wilson, J.).
I. Introduction
The United States is in the midst of a new civil war. Unlike the last civil
war, it is not between the states and the Union; rather, it is a challenge by
American Indian tribes against the states and the United States. Unlike the last
one, this civil war has seen many of its battles occur in state and federal courts.
Though the war began when the first white men settled on the North American
continent, and has continued unabated to the present, the struggle has reached
a new stage in which the Indian tribe rather than the settler is on the offensive.'
This new offensive has been a fertile source of legal issues of which the most
basic is the question of tribal sovereignty.
This article will examine the claim of tribal sovereignty' with a view towards
both defining the issue and assessing its legitimacy. This examination is desirable
* Member of Massachusetts and Arizona Bars; LL.M., Harvard University, 1975; J.D.,
University of Notre Dame, 1972; B.S., Holy Cross College. 1965.
1 The press provides us with evidence of this Indian revolution on a weekly basis. Follow-
ing are some examples of these battles: (a) In 1974 a group of Iroquois Indians took over
a portion of the Adirondack State Park in New York, claiming ownership to nine million acres
in the states of New York and Vermont. New York filed an eviction action in federal court and
the Indians were expected to file a motion to dismiss, contending the matter should be litigated
in an international tribunal or settled through diplomatic negotiations between the United States
and the tribe. TIME, Dec. 23, 1974, at 16. (b) In November, 1974, Indians alleging to be
Wampanogas filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
against the town of Gay Head claiming ownership to 238 acres of land, alleging that the State
of Massachusetts wrongfully deeded the land to the town in 1870 without the consent of the
United States. Boston Globe, Jan. 19, 1975, at 42, col. 1. (c) The Penobscot and Passa-
maquoddy tribes have filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of
Maine, against the State of Maine, seeking inter alia, to recover half the State of Maine
alleging that their treaties with the states of Massachusetts and Maine were invalid. Boston
Globe, Jan. 12, 1975, at 36. See O'TooLE & TUREEN, State Power and the Passamaquoddy
Tribe, 23 Ma. L. REv. 1 (1971). (d) On January 1, 1975, in a nationally publicized incident
involving the leaders of the militant American Indian Movement, an armed band of Menominee
Indians invaded and occupied a privately owned monastery in Gresham, Wisconsin. Boston
Globe, Jan. 9, 1975, at 14 (evening ed.). See also TIME, Feb. 17, 1975, at 8. (e) In 1973,
members of the American Indian Movement occupied Wounded Knee on the Sioux's Pine
Ridge Reservation in South Dakota and a shoot-out between the Indians and the F.B.I. left
two persons dead. Boston Globe, Jan. 19, 1975, at A-4 '(Focus). (f) The Fairchild Corporation
operated an electronics plant on that portion of the Navajo Reservation in the State of New
Mexico under a lease with the Navajo Tribe. After the corporation laid off 140 Navajo
employees, twenty armed Navajos seized the plant, saying they would not leave even if the
plant were closed. Boston Globe, Mar. 2, 1975, at 19.
2 Tribes. or groups of Indians purporting to be tribes, are asserting ambitious and bold
claims, based upon a broad claim of tribal sovereignty. For example, Vine Deloria, a Sioux, and
a former executive director of the National Congress of American Indians, would like the
United States to return the American portion of the continent to Indians. Short of this, he
argues for the restoration of total Indian independence from the United States. See V. DELORIA,
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since federal, state and tribal courts can expect endless litigation involving tribal
and individual Indian claims. The article will first briefly discuss the effect of
conquest in international law. Thereafter follows an examination of federal
constitutional provisions relating to Indians. Then, the notion of tribal sover-
eignty will be examined against the background of the congressional response to
the presence of native Americans. Most of the major United States Supreme
Court opinions which have dealt with Indian law problems will then be examined
to see if some stable notion of the role of the tribe in the federal system has
emerged. Because tribal sovereignty is examined in this way, many of the major
developments in Indian law are exposed, and the article, therefore, provides a
useful document for introduction to the problems of Indian law.
II. American Indian Tribes and the Effect of Discovery and
Conquest in International Law
Citizens of European nations traveled to North America, discovered it (at
least as far as Europeans were concerned), established settlements on it, claimed
it for their respective sovereign nations, and made war with its native inhabitants,
the American Indians. Within 400 years,3 the conquest was complete.
No doubt, the American colonists represented the sovereignty of Great
Britain; it is equally clear that the various Indian tribes were sovereign states.'
OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH (1971); and V. DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TRATIES
(1974). For an autobiographical statement by Deloria, and his thoughts on the Indian move-
ment, see A. JOSEPHY, RED POWER 247-59 (1971). Another author emerging from the Indian
movement with a similar position says that, "The aim of Red, or Indian, Power-the right of
Indians to be free of colonialist rule and to run their own affairs... is the major theme of con-
temporary Indian affairs.... ." A. JOSEPHY, RED POWER 19 (1971). See also W. WASHBURN, RED
MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW 240 (1971). While the recurring theme of the activist group
within the Indian revolution is separation from the United States, it was not always this way. R.
GESSNER, MASSACRE 406-07 (DeCapo Press ed. 1972). As recently as 1961, it appeared that
the goal of American Indians was not separation, but rather full enjoyment of the bounty of
America. Statement of the American Indian Conference held in Chicago in 1961, quoted in
V. VOGEL, THIS COUNTRY WAS OuRs 212 (1972). This view of helping the Indian to
achieve a greater portion of the economic pie, but at the same time preserving Indian cultural
identity, seems to be the current policy of the Congress acting through the Bureau of Indian
Affairs of the Department of the Interior. T. TAYLOR, THE STATES AND THEIR INDIAN
CITIZENS 168-72 (1972), published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The appendices of this
volume contain as much raw data on Indian tribes as can be found in any single volume.
Another moderate view stresses the desirability of the maintenance of Indian cultural identity,
but within the federal system, and only to the extent federalism can accommodate special
interests based upon race. See H. FEY & D. McNICKLE, INDIANS AND OTHER AMERICANS
(rev. ed. 1970) (hereinafter referred to as FEY & MONICKLE). This book is available in paper-
back and is the most concise source of comprehensive information about the historical develop-
ment of Indian issues. Other books, articles and tracts relating to Indian issues are plentiful,
but their quality and objectivity vary enormously. See, e.g., EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS
REGIONAL LIBRARY SYSTEM, AMERICAN INDIAN: A SELECTED READING LIST (1973); T.
TAYLOR, THE STATES AND THEIR INDIAN CITIZENS 283-86 (Selected Bibliography) (1972);
U.S. Department of the Interior, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT AMERICAN INDIANS
31-41 (reading list) (1970). Some are new efforts to restate the historical development of
Indian-American relationships. See, e.g., V. VOGEL, THIS COUNTRY WAS OURS (1972); W.
WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES. A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(1973) (in four volumes). Others are position papers for the Indian movement. See, e.g., V.
DELORIA, OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH (1971).
3 Say, from Columbus' discovery in 1492, to the end of the nineteenth century.
4 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 4 (1965), which defines "state" as follows: "'state' . . . means an entity that has a defined




At least before the Europeans arrived, the tribes exercised total self-government
without outside influence over the lands they occupied. What effect, then, did
this "discovery" and conquest have on the status of Indian tribes as sovereign
states within the doctrine of traditional international law?
A state can acquire sovereignty over territory in various ways, two of which
are conquest (or annexation) and cession.'
A state acquires sovereignty over the territory of another state by conquest
under two sets of circumstances:
(a) Where the territory annexed has been conquered or subjugated by the
annexing state. (b) Where the territory annexed is in a position of virtual
subordination to the annexing state at the time the latter's intention of an-
nexation is declared.... Conquest of a territory as under (a) is not suf-
ficient to constitute acquisition of title; there must be, in addition, a formally
declared intention to annex .... 6
On the other hand, a state acquires sovereignty over the territory of another
state by cession, when the ceding state transfers its territory to the acquiring state.
[Cession] rests on the principle that the right of transferring its territory is a
fundamental attribute of the sovereignty of a State.
The cession of a territory may be voluntary, or it may be made under
compulsion as a result of a war conducted successfully by the State to which
the territory is to be ceded. As a matter of fact, a cession of territory follow-
ing defeat in war is more usual than annexation.7
Applying these general rules to the historical reality of British, and later,
American claims to the United States, it is clear that the effect of conquest and
cession leaves the Indian tribes with no internationally recognizable claim to
sovereignty over any of the territory now part of the United States. The fact is
that Indian tribes were conquered, subjugated, and cast into a position of virtual
subordination. And the United States has, as will be demonstrated, expressly and
impliedly declared an intent to annex the lands it now claims. Also, lands not
taken by actual combat were voluntarily or involuntarily ceded to the United
States by treaty and agreement."
At least one international tribunal' is in accord. In the case of Cayuga
Indian Claims (Great Britain v. United States) ,' Great Britain attempted to sue
the United States on behalf of the Cayuga Indian Nation. The tribunal held that
the claim could not be maintained on behalf of the Cayuga Nation, but only "on
behalf of the Cayuga Indians in Canada," because the Cayuga Nation, "an
5 See W. FRIEDMAN, 0. LISSITZEN & R. PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAw 465 (1969).
6 J. STARKx, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (7th ed. 1972).
7 Id. at 181.
8 See notes 197-204 and accompanying text infra on the use of the treaty power and the
power of the Congress, by unilateral action, to abrogate a treaty.
9 What the United States Supreme Court has said on this matter is discussed below.
10 20 Am. J. INT'L L. 574 (1926) (American and British Claims Arbitration Tribunal).
One of the three arbitrators was Roscoe Pound.
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Indian tribe [many of whose members were in the state of New York, not in
Canada] ... is not a legal unit of international law."11 The tribunal explained
its position as follows:
From the time of the discovery of America the Indian tribes have been
treated as under the exclusive protection of the Power which by discovery
or conquest or cession held the land which they occupied .... The Power
which had sovereignty over the land has always been held the sole judge of
its relations with the tribes within its domain. The rights in this respect
acquired by discovery have been held exclusive.... So far as an Indian tribe
exists as a legal unit, it is by virtue of the domestic law of the sovereign
nation within whose territory the tribe occupies the land, and so far only
as that law recognizes it.2
III. The Tribe in the United States Constitution
Having concluded that an Indian tribe is not an internationally recognized
sovereign, the status of the tribe under the United States Constitution should be
examined. The Constitution does not, in fact, contemplate a role for the tribe
in the federal system, i.e., the existence of the tribe as a self-governing legal entity
is not constitutionally guaranteed.
There is one provision of the Constitution relating to tribes,3 and two less
important provisions which refer to Indians.14 Article I, § 8(3) provides that
"[t]he Congress shall have the Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." And, as will be seen,
Congress has exercised its commerce power over Indian tribes in a pervasive and
pre-emptive way from the very beginning. Note that "foreign Nations," "States,"
and "Indian tribes" are separately delineated. Chief Justice Marshall used this
delineation in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," as support for his conclusion that
tribes were not foreign nations.
In addition to article I, § 8(3), and the two less important provisions men-
tioned previously, two other provisions of the Constitution warrant mention.
Article II, § 2(2) gives the President and the Senate the power to make treaties.
The use of this power with Indian tribes is discussed further in section IV.B.
The other provision, the currently emasculated tenth amendment, 6 divides
powers into three groups: the United States, the States, and the people. On its
face, it does not provide for Indian tribes. And since no other provision of the
Constitution can be read as a source of tribal power, it apparently forecloses the
tribes' constitutional right to entity status.
11 Id. at 577.
12 Id. (emphasis added).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (3).
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2(3) and the fourteenth amendment. Both article I, § 2 (3),
and the fourteenth amendment which amended it, simply exclude "Indians not taxed" in
determining a state's representation in the House of Representatives. Article I, § 2(3) also
excluded Indians not taxed from a state's apportionment of direct taxes.
15 30 U.S.'(5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831).
16 The tenth amendment provides as follows: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people."
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This conclusion is supported by what little there is in The Federalist regard-
ing Indians or Indian tribes. Alexander Hamilton saw the Indians as savages,
the natural enemies of the United States and a justification for a standing army
under the Constitution.' The Indian nations were a threat to the union.'" John
Jay was a bit more charitable. He also saw the Indians as a danger warranting
a good national government, but blamed all Indian wars on the states as dis-
tinguished from the "feeble" federal government. 9 James Madison, commenting
on the commerce power with Indian tribes, observed that article I, § 8 (3), cured
the defect in the Articles of Confederation which limited federal power to Indians
not within a state.2"
These few references are the only mention of Indians in this major docu-
ment contemporaneous with the Constitution. Accordingly, the conclusion is
valid that neither the Constitution nor its draftsmen foresaw or provided for the
continuing existence of Indian tribes. Indeed, forty years after The Federalist, in
1828, James Kent was to predict the doom of all Indians:
[Indians] have generally, and with some very limited exceptions, been un-
able to share in the enjoyments, or to exist in the presence of civilization;
and judging from their past history, the Indians of this continent appear to
be destined, at no very distant period of time, to disappear with those vast
forests which once covered the country, and the existence of which seems
essential to their own.
21
IV. The Exercise of Congressional Power Over the Tribe
A. General Comments
The Congress of the United States, exercising its power to regulate com-
merce with Indian tribes under article I, § 8(3), and its power in conjunction
with the President to make treaties with Indian tribes, under article II, § 2(2),
has been the major architect of American Indian law and policy. Congress
reflects the interests and values of American society; and, accordingly, the con-
gressional treatment of Indians has fluctuated from total separation to total
assimilation, including the complete termination of tribal status.
Many commentators have criticized Congress for this. The literature is
replete with remarks such as "Congress has never taken up its responsibility of
clearly defining the national goal regarding the status of the Indian," 2 or,
"federal policy has vacillated between attempted assimilation of the Indians into
white society and protection of their cultural identity."2 " Little of this criticism
17 THE FEDER&LIST No. 24, at 161 (Mentor ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
18 THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 163 (Mentor ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
19 THE FEDERALiST No. 3, at 44 (Mentor ed. 1961) (J. Jay).
20 THE FEDE-ALiST No. 42, at 268-69 (Mentor ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
21 3 J. KENT, COMmENTAPmS 318 (1st ed. 1828).
22 Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. R.v. 445, 485 (1970).
23 Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1818, 1821 (1968).
See Bean, The Limits of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Cornucopia of Inherent Powers, 49
N.D.L. R v. 303 (1973). See also, Nixon, Introduction, 48 N.D.L. Rv. 529 (1972), where
the former President said, "I envisioned an approach which would carefully steer a course
between excessive Federal control and termination [of the tribes]."
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is warranted. The implication that Congress is somehow culpable for this vacil-
lation is unfair. Congress reflects the policies of its time. The policies and the
law change because the historical conditions change. The 'Americas of 1800,
1880, and 1950 were wholly different societies. This phenomenon can be dearly
seen in the exercise of the treaty power and, more importantly, in the exercise
of the commerce power.
B. Treaties
The original thirteen colonies, as agents of the British crown, entered into
vast and elaborate treaties with Indian tribes."' The Indian wars in New England
were numerous, but are now long forgotten.25 Colonial reservations were the
precursors of federal reservations. By 1700, most of the Indians in Massachusetts
were placed on Massachusetts colonial reservations.2" But the colonists expected
the assimilation of the Indian into Massachusetts society, and, therefore, the
reservation system was not meant to be permanent." "By the time the United
States inaugurated the federal reservation policy for the Indian tribes in 1786,
the Massachusetts system of reservations had already served its purpose and
virtually came to an end."2"
Just as the colonies dealt with Indian tribes through treaties before sepa-
ration from Great Britain, they continued to deal with Indian tribes through
treaties during the Revolutionary War. The first federal treaty with a tribe
occurred in 1778, with the Delaware Indians.29 It was designed, if not to gain
the loyalty of the Indians, to at least keep them from supporting the British in
the war. The new country guaranteed to the Delawares whatever territory they
were entitled to by former treaties.2"
Since article II, § 2(2), of the Constitution required only Senate ratification,
the House of Representatives was never involved with Indian treaties. The Senate
picked up where the Continental Congress left off. Between 1778 and 1868, the
last year in which the United States dealt with Indian tribes by treaty, the
United States Senate ratified 370 Indian treaties.2"
24 See INDIAN TREATIES 1736-1762 (Historical Soc'y of Pa. ed. 1938). For treaties
between the Penobscott Indians and Massachusetts, later assumed by Maine, see STATE OF
MAINE, INDIAN TREATIES WITH THE STATE OF MAINE (1843).
25 See H. SYLVESTER. INDIAN WARS OF NEW ENGLAND (1910) (in 3 volumes).
26 Kawashima, Legal Origins of the Indian Reservation in Colonial Massachusetts, 13
Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 42 (1969).
27 Id. at 56.
28 Id.
29 Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13. Volume 7 of the Statutes at
Large is entitled "Treaties Between the United States and the Indian Tribes," and is devoted
entirely to Indian treaties.
30 Id., art. 6 at 14.
31 HousE COMM. OF INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88th CONG., 2d SESS., LIST OF
INDIAN TREATIES 1-6 (Comm. Print No. 33, 1964). All treaties appear in volumes 7 through
18 of Statutes at Large. Various compilations of Indian treaties exist.' Two early compilations
are U.S. DEP'T OF WAR, INDIAN TREATIES (1826) and COMMISSION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
TREATIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SEVERAL INDIAN TRIBES
(1837). The complete compilation is C. KAPPLER, LAWS AND TREATIES (Vols. 1 & 2, 1902)
(Vol. 3, 1913) (Vol. 4, 1929). A recent compilation which includes, along with treaties, un-
ratified treaties and agreements is INSTITUTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LAw, INC.,
A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS MADE BY INDIAN TRIBES WITH THE




The use of the treaty power in dealing with Indian tribes in the formative
era of American territorial expansion was a natural phenomenon. Ever westward
expansion was to be accomplished by voluntary relinquishment of the soil if
possible, and if not, by war. Hence, "[i]t was decided very early that compacts
entered into with Indian tribes required ratification by the Senate and had the
same status, force, and dignity as agreements with sovereign nations." 2 More-
over, the use of treaties by the United States in its relations with Indian tribes
merely continued the practice of Great Britain and the colonies.
But, as the power of the United States expanded, the use of the treaty
power relative to Indian tribes raised serious questions. Treaties with Indian
tribes suggested sovereignty in the tribe. What was perhaps natural, truly neces-
sary, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became an embarrassment by
the nineteenth century.
As early as 1817 [Andrew] Jackson had written to President Monroe that
"I have long viewed treaties with the Indians an absurdity not to be rec-
onciled to the principles of our government. The Indians are the subjects
of the United States, inhabiting its territory and acknowledging its sover-
eignty, then is it not absurd for the sovereign to negotiate by treaty with the
subject."
33
While in the abstract the implication of tribal sovereignty arising from
treaties with tribes appears viable, an examination of a typical treaty suggests
the contrary. In the treaty between the United States and the Cherokees in
1835,"' the Cherokees ceded all their land east of the Mississippi River to the
United States for $5 million.35 The United States ceded lands west of the Missis-
sippi River to the Cherokee Tribe and agreed that the lands so ceded would
never be included within the territorial limits of a state or territory without its
consent. 6 The United States also promised that the tribe could make its own
laws and be governed by them, "provided always that they shall not be incon-
sistent with the Constitution of the United States and such acts of Congress as
have been or may be passed regulating trade and intercourse with the Indians;
and also, that they [Cherokee laws] shall not be considered as extending to such
citizens and army of the United States as may travel or reside in the Indian
country by permission of the United States."
37
Rather plainly, the tribe was subjected to the sovereignty of the United
States. The tribe was granted powers of self-government, but subject to the
Constitution and any law Congress might enact. Moreover, its governmental
powers did not extend to non-Indians entering Indian territory lawfully. Thus,
32 THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION OF
RATIFIED INDIAN TREATIES 1801-1869 1 (1949).
33 Higgins, International Law Consideration of the American Indian Nations by the United
States, 3 Amiz. L. Rlv. 74, 82 '(1961), quoting from BASSET, CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW
JACKSON 279-81 (1955).
34 Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (1835).
35 Id., art. 1 at 479.
36 Id., art. 5 at 481. As will be shown below, this is the result of federal exhaustion of the




the very terms of the treaty deny the tribe the sovereignty which is supposed to
arise by implication from the fact that a treaty was made.
It must also be remembered that many of the treaties with Indian tribes
were peace treaties which came after the wars which implemented America's
manifest destiny. Whatever may have been the status of Indian tribal sover-
eignity prior to treaty making, after a war was concluded and a treaty made,
the tribe was in fact subjected to the power of the United States. And whether
treating Indian tribes as nations was a mere pretense, as suggested by Professor
Chill, 8 or a sincere effort based upon a belief in tribal independence matters
little since the treaties were violated by both sides, and "Indian attacks and
American punitive expeditions continued until the frontier was finally conquered
and the Indians subdued."39 It must be remembered, too, that the conquest of
America and the subjugation of the Indian tribes were at the time seen to be
justified by the Christian's duty to spread the word of the Gospel to heathens
and the duty to civilize (Europeanize) what seemed to be a backward people."'
What now seems an injustice seemed at the time, if not virtuous, at least justi-
fiable.
Whatever inference was raised with respect to tribal sovereignty by the
use of the treaty power by the United States is now a moot point. For by the
Act of March 3, 1871,41 the Congress of the United States proclaimed that:
[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe,
or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty .... 42
Thereafter, no treaty was made with an Indian tribe. It would be difficult to
conceive of language evidencing an intent to extinguish tribal sovereignty vis-h-
vis the United States clearer than this. As will be seen, existing treaties with
Indian tribes have a status no greater than that of a statute, and therefore may
be abrogated by the unilateral act of Congress.
C. Statutes: An Historical Development
The historical development of American policy toward the Indians is
nowhere better revealed than in the major congressional legislation dealing with
38 E. CHILL, Commentary, in 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967
664 (F. Israel ed. 1967).
39 Id. at 665. See P. EDWARDS, THE MEDICINE LODGE INDIAN PEACE TREATY (1961) for a
human account of the events surrounding the making of a treaty.
40 A typical comment of the time, though made in reference to Canada's Indians, is the
following: "Let us have Christianity and civilization to leaven the mass of heathenism and
paganism among the Indian tribes; .. . ." A. MoRRIs, THE TREATIES OF CANAbA WITH THE
INDIANS OF MANITOBA AND THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES 296 (1880). The author was
the Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba and the Northwest Territory. His account of Canada's
treaties with its Indian tribes reveals a sensitivity to the problem of displacement. For recent
materials on Indian law problems in Canada, see Symposium, 38 SASK. L. REv. 1-249 (1974).
41 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat.
544).
42 Id. Congress provided a savings clause which provided that obligations arising under
existing treaties would not be invalidated. Id.
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Indian tribes. Since the existence of entity status for the tribe, the extent of
tribal self-government, and the extent of tribal immunity from state interference
are nowhere guaranteed by the United States Constitution," these matters have
historically been wholly within the legislative anbit of the Congress, usually under
the commerce clause, article I, § 8(3). Accordingly, law and policy have waxed
and waned with the tempo of the times. It is in this area that Congress has been
subjected to the greatest criticism; yet this "oversimplified" criticism "obscure[s]
the fact that Indian policy did not spring full-blown from some statesman's brow,
but rather was a slow growth, developing under the press of circumstances and
the pressures of diverse groups. 4 4
1. The Formative Era, 1790-1834
In less than one year after the United States Constitution was ratified, the
Congress enacted its first measure governing relations between citizens of the
United States and Indian tribes. 5 It was the first of a series of so-called "non-
intercourse" acts to be adopted during the next 44 years. As the label implies,
the Act was designed to keep the Americans away from the Indians. For
example, it required the issuance of federal licenses to trade with tribes,4 and
prohibited the alienation of Indian or tribal land to Americans or any of the
states, in the absence of a federal treaty authorizing it. It was Congress' first
attempt to preempt all Indian-American relationships from individual or state
action. The Act was to expire automatically at the end of the session next follow-
ing two years after its passage.48 Accordingly, similar new legislation was en-
acted in 1793,"9 but interestingly enough, it provided for federal court jurisdiction
for any criminal violations of its provisions."0 It too expired of its own force, and
the third piece of legislation was enacted in 1796."' This third nonintercourse
act was slightly more elaborate. It set boundaries between Indian country and
the rest of the United States," and provided the death penalty for the non-
Indian's murder of an Indian on tribal land. 3 Expiring of its own force, it was
replaced by a fourth act,54 which expired on March 3, 1802, and which was not
replaced until March 3, 1813."s Therefore, between 1802 and 1813, no federal
legislation existed regulating affairs with Indians.
The objective of these nonintercourse acts was to ensure westward settle-
43 See Part III supra, and Part V infra.
44 F. PRUCHA, A&EPICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS vii (1962).
45 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
46 Id.
47 Id. § 4 at 138.
48 Id. § 7 at 138.
49 Act of March 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329.
50 Id. § 10 at 331.
51 Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469.
52 Id.
53 Id. § 6 at 470.
54 Act of March 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743.
55 Act of March 3, 1813, ch. 61, 2 Stat. 829. This Act allowed the President to retaliate




ment, but at the same time minimize conflict between non-Indians and Indians."6
The acts were not altogether successful at keeping the peace. A random sampling
of the early Statutes at Large will show that Congress consistently appropriated
funds to suppress Indian hostilities.5"
The provisions in these early nonintercourse acts relating to federal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indian crimes in Indian territory, requiring federal consent for
Indian alienation of land, indeed, the very existence of the acts themselves, sug-
gest that Congress was dealing with entities (the tribes) which in fact possessed
attributes of something less than sovereignty. The policy was separation and
nonintercourse, not so much for the benefit of the maintenance of tribal integrity
as for the orderly advance of the frontier."
2. The Intercourse Act of 1834"
After 44 years of experience with sporadic nonintercourse acts, the first
major piece of federal Indian legislation emerged. The frontier was advancing
at an ever faster rate, and the time had come to establish a more permanent
mechanism by which non-Indian confficts with Indians could be minimized. It
provided licensing for trade with Indians," prohibited non-Indians from barter-
'ing with Indians for hunting and cooking items,6 prohibited non-Indians from
hunting in Indian country,62 prohibited non-Indians from grazing their animals in
Indian country,63 prohibited settlement on Indian land,"' prohibited the convey-
ance of Indian land except by federal treaty,65 prohibited speeches in or messages
to Indian country designed to disturb the peace,66 and extended federal criminal
jurisdiction to all crimes committed in Indian country, except as "to crimes com-
mitted by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian."6
Rather clearly, the whole thrust of the act was to control the conduct of
Indians and non-Indians in a detailed and preemptive way so that the natural
expansion westward would be as orderly as possible. The policy was separation,
but with the ultimate motive of either the future assimilation or annihilation of
the tribes. The events of history were such that by 1871, Congress was to formally
deny nation status to Indian tribes by the Act of March 3, 1871.681
56 See F. PRUCHA, supra note 44, at 1-3.
57 See, e.g., 5 Stat. 1, 6, 8, 17, 33, and 65.
58 See F. PRucHA, supra note 44, at 1-3.





64 Id. § 11.
65 Id. § 12.
66 Id. §13.
67 Id. § 25 at 733.
68 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat.
544) (discussed in note 41 and accompanying text supra).
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3. The General Allotment Act of 1887:69 Indian Citizenship and Assimilation
A contributor to the second volume of the Harvard Law Review in 1888
divided the history of Indian law into four periods, culminating in the General
Allotment Act.7" The first period, from colonization to 1829, found the white
man contending with the Indians for possession of the continent. When they
were not in actual combat, the whites dealt with the Indians under international
law, but always, through its courts, "asserted [their] title to the soil by right of
discovery, and extended that claim, territorially, as fast as the progress of coloni-
zation and emigration carried the advancing line of white settlement westward."'"
The presidency of Andrew Jackson began the second period, from 1829 to
1871, "which may be characterized as the period of compulsory emigration under
the form of consent by voluntary treaty."7"
With Congress in 1871 terminating the treatymaking process, the next 16
years were described as a "period of confinement on reservations under executive
control.""3
The fourth period was the future. "[T]he ultimate objective point to which
all efforts for progress should be directed is to fix upon the Indian the same
personal, legal, and political status which is common to all other inhabitants." '74
The Indian wars were nearly at an end, the tribes were subjugated, and westward
expansion was complete. In the face of this new reality, what should be the
status of the Indian tribe? The natural response was that it should end with
Indians being assimilated into the now-dominant culture. Congress responded
to this new reality accordingly with the passage of the General Allotment Act,
whose main objective was to allot tribal lands to individual Indians, end the
status of the tribe, and make a citizen out of the Indian. This Act was no irra-
tional fluctuation in congressional policy. When the reality called for separation,
the Intercourse Acts were appropriate. When there was nothing left to keep
separate, assimilation seemed appropriate. The people of the period felt that
civilization was not possible without individual ownership of land. 5 The con-
tinent had changed. The tribes could no longer lead the nomadic life of the
hunter. If the Indians were to survive at all, they were to become independent
farmers.
To this end, the Act provided that tribal land, whether held by treaty,
76
act of Congress, or Executive order could be allotted "in severalty to any Indian
located thereon,"7 7 in accordance with a prescribed formula. Consistent with the
formula, an Indian could select whatever portion of tribal land he wanted, but
69 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (amended and codified in scattered sections
of 25 U.S.C.).
70 Abbot, Indians and the Law, 2 HARV. L. Rav. 167 '(1888).
71 Id. at 167-68.
72 Id. at 171.
73 Id. at 173.
74 Id. at 174.
75 D. Otis, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (1973). Otis
provides a definitive history of the General Allotment Act.
76 For the power of Congress to unilaterally abrogate a treaty by subsequent statute, see
notes 197-204 and accompanying text infra.
77 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388.
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if he failed to make an election within four years after the President directed
allotment, the Secretary of the Interior would make his selection for him." The
United States would hold the allotted land in trust for 25 years and thereafter
convey it in fee to the individual Indian, or if deceased, to "his heirs according
to the laws of the State or territory where such land is located.""9 At the end of
the trust period, the Indian allottee would become subject to the civil and
criminal laws of the state or territory in which he resided.8 ° The Act provided
an equal protection clause against the territories in favor of the -Indian,8 and
provided that both individual Indian allottees born in the United States and
every other Indian not residing with a tribe who has "adopted the habits of
civilized life" were henceforth declared to be American citizens.
8 2
As to those reservation lands remaining after allotment, the United States
would purchase them (with tribal consent), distribute them to settlers, and hold
the proceeds in trust for Indians, from which Congress would appropriate educa-
tional funds.8 "
Whatever the wisdom of this assimilation plan, Congress clearly asserted the
full sovereign power of the United States against the continued existence of the
tribe. The assumption underlying such a plan is that the continuing existence of
the tribe as a self-governing entity is a function of federal legislative grace.
Allotment and assimilation were the Indian law and policy of the United
States between 1887 and 1934. Many Indians became United States citizens
under the provisions of the Allotment Act. To fill whatever gaps may have been
left, in 1924 Congress declared that "all non-citizen Indians born within the ter-
ritorial limits of the United States" are citizens of the United States. 4 The
statute's validity was tested somewhat later in Ex Parte Green,"5 a case in which
an Indian was inducted into the United States Army. He filed a petition for
habeas corpus, alleging that he was not a citizen of the United States within the
meaning of the Selective Service law, that any attempt by Congress to make him
a citizen under the 1924 Act violated treaty rights, that his tribe had never been
conquered by the United States and was an independent nation by virtue of
certain eighteenth-century treaties. The court denied his claim and held that
even if his treaty argument were valid, where there is a conflict between a treaty
and a subsequent statute, the statute prevails, citing the Head Money Cases.8"
A high point in the aftermath of the General Allotment Act's assimilative
policy came in 1929. As mentioned earlier, by treaty and the early Intercourse






83 Id. § 5. Between 1887 and 1934 approximately 90 million acres of tribal land were
distributed for settlement. Note, The Extension of County jurisdiction Over Indian Reserva-
tions in California: Public Law 280 and the Ninth Circuit, 25 HAST. L.J. 1451, 1464 (1974).
84 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2) (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 2. 1924, ch. 233, 43
Stat. 253). Though the act provided that citizenship would not affect an Indian's right to tribal
property, it did not guarantee the tribe's right to tribal property.
85 123 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 668 (1942).
86 112 U.S. 580 (1884). Discussed infra.
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authority in dealing with Indian tribes. It had continued to assert the sovereignty
of the United States over the tribe. In doing so, it left little or no room for state
action on the reservation or in Indian country, not because the Constitution
prohibited it, but because Congress saw a need for a uniform national policy
with respect to Indians. Consequently, it preempted the field. But the need
for a national policy diminished as the tribes moved in history from sovereign
nations to wards of the federal government. The whole purpose of allotment
was to end the special status of the tribe, since the historical justification for its
recognition no longer existed. The goal was to integrate Indian citizens into
the federal system. To this end, in 1929, Congress enacted measures allowing the
states to enter tribal lands to enforce health and sanitation standards and to en-
force compulsory school attendance of Indian children as provided by state law.8"
And with it a new principle emerged: the states could exert their sovereignty
over the tribe whenever permitted to do so by Congress. But along with a new
economic doctrine the Depression brought a new Indian policy.
4. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934:" The Attempt to Stem the Tide of
Historical Inevitability
A recurring theme in materials relating to federal Indian law89 is that one
man, Felix S. Cohen, single-handedly slowed the forces of history. From the
first colonial settlement until 1934, the consistent policy of the United States
had been, at first, to seize and possess the continent, and then, to assimilate any
Indians who might be left. But the New Deal brought men to Washington who,
for the first time, were of the opinion that there might yet be a continuing role
for the tribe in the federal system. Felix S. Cohen was such a man: he drafted"0
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,"' and, while an employee of the Depart-
ment of Interior in 1942, he published a book which became a cause ciMbre in
the world of federal Indian law.2
Though the Indian Reorganization Act was not the first major piece of
Indian legislation to emerge from the New Deal,9" it was the most significant. It
was permissive in nature, and could be repudiated by any tribe. 4 Its major
87 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 15, 1929, ch. 216, 45 Stat.
1185).
88 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576,
48 Stat. 984).
89 See, e.g., Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. Rav. 145 (1940);
F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1971) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
90 See the Foreword to the University of New Mexico's reprint of his book. HANDBOOK,
supra note 89.
91 See comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70
MICE. L. Rev. 955 (1972).
92 HANDBOOK, supra note 89. The subsequent history of this book appears in note 107
and accompanying text infra.
93 The Indian Reorganization Act was preceded by the Johnson-O'Malley Act. 25 U.S.C.
§ 452-54 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 16, 1934, ch. 147, 48 Stat. 596). Because
the territorial isolation of tribal Indians did not insulate them from the hardships of the De-
pression, the Johnson-O'Maley Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to contract with
the states and territories [presumably Alaska] for the education, medical care, agricultural
assistance and social welfare of Indians.
94 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 18, 48 Stat. 984.
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features were the termination of allotment,95 and the provision of federal legisla-
tive authority for tribal self-government." Trusts created under the General
Allotment Act were extended indefiitely,9 7 all unallotted lands were restored to
tribal ownership, 8 and the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to acquire
land for tribes99 and create new reservations."' The goal of the Act was to allow
tribes to elect existence as a separate people as an alternative to the mandatory
assimilation of the General Allotment Act. And, the Act permitted those
tribes who elected existence to adopt a constitution and bylaws for their self-
government," 1 with certain enumerated powers in addition to any which might
have existed under prior law. They were:
[t]o employ legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be sub-
ject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent the sale,
disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other
tribal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the
Federal, State, and local Governments.
02
The Act was a last-minute attempt to prevent the inexorable doom of all
tribes predicted over one hundred years earlier by James Kent.' But, more im-
portant than the end of allotment were the Act's provisions for tribal self-gov-
ernment. While it is clearly a legislative grant of power, the Act does not go as
far as Cohen's own view. Cohen's fundamental assumption was: "those powers
which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers
granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has [sic] never been extinguished."'0 " For this position Cohen
relied on Worcester v. Georgia,' an opinion whose validity had been eroded by
history and subsequent opinions."' And even if the case enjoyed full current
vitality, Chief Justice Marshall was addressing himself to assertions of tribal
sovereignty against the states, not the United States. Rather inconsistently, then,
did Cohen concede that "[c]onquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative
power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe.-'
0'7
95 Id. §1.
96 Id. § 16. Section 12, providing Indian employment preference in the Federal Indian
Office, is discussed infra.
97 Id. §2.
98 Id. § 3.
99 Id. §5.
100 Id. § 7.
101 Id. § 16. Section 17 provided that a tribe could apply for a federal charter of incorpo-
ration, revocable by act of Congress.
102 Id. at 987.
103 See text acompanying note 21 supra.
104 HANDBoox, supra note 89, at 122.
105 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
106 Discussed in notes 175-80 and accompanying text infra.
107 CoHeN, supra note 104, at 123. But Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, pub-
lished by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior in 1942, became the
major treatise on federal Indian law. As noted, Cohen opined that Indian tribes possessed in-
herent powers of self-government quite independent of the United States Constitution. By the
1950's, however, congressional policy toward tribes returned once again to assimilation, i.e., the
termination of all tribes. Accordingly, the Department of the Interior authored and published in
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The revitalization of the tribe by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
and Cohen's 1942 book were not to survive into the 1950's. By the mid-1940's
Congress was showing its impatience with tribal matters. Ancient Indian claims
were an ever-present pest. Because of the sovereign immunity of the United
States, laches, and statutes of limitations, each Indian claim required special leg-
islation. In an effort to fulfill its moral (and to a lesser extent, legal) obligations
to Indian tribes and to put an end to tribal claims against the United States
once and for all, the Act of August 13, 1946108 created the Indian Claims Com-
mission to hear all tribal claims against the United States whether arising out of
contract, tort, treaty or otherwise. 9 The jurisdiction of the Commission was
limited to claims which existed before August 13, 1946,10 and all such claims had
to be brought within five years (i.e., by August 13, 1951) or be forever barred.'
All tribal claims arising after August 13, 1946, were to be heard in the United
States Court of Claims."' The Commission was directed to notify all tribes of the
provisions of the Act and investigate claims."' All final determinations by the
Commission were reviewable by appeal to the United States Court of Claims. 14
Since pre-1946 claims could be brought only within the five-year period,
the Act provided for the termination of the Commission within 10 years."5
However, the Commission has been extended over the years to hear the original
3701. claims filed before 1951. The original 370 claims were divided into 605
docketed claims, and by 1968 (after 22 years) 149 were dismissed, and final
judgment was entered in 134."' Congress has extended the life of the Com-
mission to 1977,"1' but it is doubtful if the remaining cases will have been settled
in nine years." 9
1958 a new book called FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, which reasserted the power of the United States
over Indian tribes. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958). Finally
a third book, published in 1971 by the University of New Mexico, reprints Cohen's original
work, and castigates the 1958 volume as a bogus version of Cohen's book. F. COHEN, HAND-
3OOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW '(Univ. of N.M. ed. 1971) at v-vi. The world is still waiting
for a revised version from the Department of the Interior, as directed by Congress in 1968.
Under the Act of April 11, 1968, P.L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, Congress directed the Secretary
of the Interior to revise and republish its version of Federal Indian Law.
108 Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (amended and codified in 25 U.S.C. §
70 et seq. (1970)).
109 Id. § 2.
110 Id.
111 Id. § 12. The language of this section indicates the intent of Congress to terminate
ancient claims with finality: "no claim existing before such date [August 13, 19463 but not
presented within such period [five years) may thereafter be submitted to any court or ad-
ministrative agency for consideration, nor will such claim thereafter be entertained by the
Congress." Id. This section should be a powerful tool for any United States Attorney defend-
ing the United States in actions brought by tribes based upon pre-1946 claims.
112 Id. § 24.
113 Id. § 13.
114 Id. § 20.
115 Id. § 23.
116 Vance, The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commission, 45 N.D.L.
REv. 325, 329 (1969).
117 Id.
118 25 U.S.C.A. § 70 (Supp. 1975).
119 Apparently, the Commission has chosen to sit as a court and is, therefore, passive. It
has not taken its investigatory role under the statute seriously. See Vance, supra note 116, at
335. See also Vance, Indian Claims, 38 Sask. L. REv. 1 '(1974).
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5. Termination of the Tribes: Congressional Grants of Civil and Criminal
Jurisdiction over the Remaining Tribes to the States
After the 20-year lull in which the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
and Cohen's book slowed the inexorable force of history, Congress, by 1953,
returned to its former policy of assimilation. By now, it was unnecessary to sub-
jugate tribes; their status as self-governing entities could be terminated by leg-
islation. Congress expressed its intent by Concurrent Resolution;... the words
were strikingly similar to those used in connection with the policy behind allot-
ment in 1871."2
[I]t is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians
within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws
and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to
other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United
States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to
American citizenship; . . ."2
Though this resolution has been severely criticized, 2 it should be noted that
assimilation (in the sense of no racial classifications under the law) has always
been regarded as a positive goal in the melting pot that is America. Though
diversity and cultural identity have always been protected in a private context in a
pluralistic society, it is questionable whether the protection of these values in a
public, governmental way is consistent with the United States Constitution. 24
In any event, Congress had no doubt that it could legislate away the
existence of a tribal entity, and in the years that followed, many Indian tribes
were so terminated. 25 The legislation provided for the closing of the tribal
rolls, ' the sale of tribal land2 . (proceeds to go to individual Indians), the
termination of federal recognition of Indian identity vis-4-vis federal programs, 2
and the full application of the laws of the state in which the tribe was located
to individual Indians and the tribe 29 (the tribe could elect to exist as a private
corporate entity under the laws of a state). Whatever right to self-government
granted by the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act and incorporated
in a tribal constitution was terminated.'2 0
This kind of legislation, never successfully challenged, stands for the propo-
sition that tribal self-government exists through the authority of Congress and is
not guaranteed by the federal system as established in the United States Consti-
tution.
120 1-1. R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 '(1953).
121 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
122 H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
123 See, e.g., Fey & McNickle, supra note 2, at 163-65.
124 But see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), discussed infra.
125 Termination legislation for various tribes is collected in 25 U.S.C. chapter 14 (1970).
126 See, e.g., as to the Klamath tribe in Oregon, the Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, § 3,
68 Stat. 718.
127 Id. § 6.
128 Id. § 18(a).
129 Id.
130 Id. § 19.
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For those tribes not terminated, Congress implemented its intent to incorpo-
rate Indians into the mainstream of American federalism by yielding its exclusive
jurisdiction over tribes, heretofore established by pre-emption under article I,
§ 8(3) of the Constitution, by granting its consent to any state which wanted
to assert its civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribal Indians."' The consent of
the tribe was not required."' But Congress continued to exempt tribal land from
state taxation,"' and as a result, many states were reluctant to expand jurisdiction
without a proportional increase in the tax base.
Through statutory termination and grants of jurisdiction over tribes to the
states, it can fairly be said that the 1950's were the contemporary high-water
mark of congressional intent to integrate the tribal Indian into the federal
system." 4 But the turbulent events of the 1960's caused a reassessment of Indian
policy, and the congressional goal of assimilation and termination was again
suspended.
6. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968"..
Termination was suspended"" because Indians who were members of
terminated tribes were not equipped for assimilation. Many, having spent their
proceeds rapidly, ended up as wards of the state in fact, if no longer in law."'
But assimilation without termination is difficult if not impossible. The Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 was one such nonterminating assimilative effort. The
tribe could exist, but would be subject to almost all the restraints the Bill of
Rights imposes on the federal and state governments."' This was necessary
because much earlier when the United States Supreme Court held that the Bill
of Rights was a limitation on the power of the federal government only and not
131 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 588, frequently referred to as Public Law
280. The Act itself granted the states of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and
Wisconsin civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations, with some excepted, includ-
ing any action in which a tribal Indian is a party and over all offenses committed by or against
an Indian in Indian country. §§ 2 and 4. For a discussion of whether this subjects tribal
Indians to the laws of local governments as well as laws of statewide applicability, see Note,
The Extension of County Jurisdiction Over Indian Reservations in California: Public Law 280
and the Ninth Circuit, 25 HAST. L.J. 1451 (1974). Since Public Law 280 came 15 days after
House Concurrent Resolution 108, supra note 120, one would assume that Congress intended
tribal Indians to be subject to the laws of local governments.
132 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 588. This was amended to require tribal
consent by 1968. See discussion in note 141 and accompanying text infra.
133 See Id. § 4.
134 It was in this period also that the Congress allowed tribes to lease their land, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, for commercial gain. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1970)
(originally enacted as Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 615, 69 Stat. 539). Section 5 of this Act pro-
hibited the Secretary of the Interior from approving any lease which would delay termination.
Recent commentators have read the Secretarial approval requirment of this statute to be based
upon a federal policy of preserving Indian culture. See Chambers & Price, Regulating
Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAx. L. REv. 1061,
1079-80 (1974). But § 5 on its face refutes that claim.
135 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. For a remarkably readable legislative history of this act see
Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 9 HAuv. J. LFoss. 557
(1972). See also Reiblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 Axz. L.
Rnv. 617 (1968).
136 The practice was suspended. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132
(1953) (remains unrepealed).
137 See Fey & McNickle, supra note 2, at 167-79.
138 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
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the states, it held that, for the same reason, the Bill of Rights was not applicable
to an Indian tribe."' The Act also extended the writ of habeas corpus in federal
court to test the legality of detention by an Indian tribe exercising powers of
self-government. 4 This is important, not so much for tribal Indians who could
at least be assumed to have subjected themselves to tribal government, but rather
for non-Indians who may be held by a tribal government. Without this provision
neither state nor federal court could help the non-Indian test the legality of his
detention. Finally, the Act amended § 7 of Public Law 280 to require the
consent of the tribe before a state could extend its civil and criminal jurisdiction
over a reservation.'41
On its face, this Act appears benign enough. There was no substantial
Indian opposition to the Act. Indeed, perhaps because of the provisions requiring
tribal consent before the exertion of state jurisdiction, an admittedly massive
adjustment to Public Law 280, one commentator has suggested that the Act was
intended to preserve tribal self-government." 2
Yet, the application of most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights of the
United States Constitution to tribal governments plainly stands in opposition to
claims of tribal sovereignty. Moreover, it subjects the tribes, by and large, to the
same limitations imposed on state and federal governments. 4 This will have a
homogenizing effect on tribal governments. Cultural or historical practices
contrary to the provisions of the statutory bill of rights must fall. It is a statement
by Congress that certain rights are so fundamental that whatever interest a tribe
might have contrary to such rights must fail.'" A crucial question is whether the
same standards of due process apply to tribes, or whether cultural differences may
lawfully be considered.'45 One court, already facing this question, held that
the equal protection clause in the Act 48 requires the application of the one-man
one-vote standard of Baker v. Carr"" to tribal elections. 4" Just as there was
objection to the application of this principle to the states, already there is a sug-
gestion that Indian tribal values should prevail over the values expressed by the
equal protection clause. 4" The extent to which such a suggestion might prevail
remains to be seen.
The Indian Civil Rights Act is nonterminating to the extent it requires
tribal consent prior to a state's claim of jurisdiction over it. But it is assimilative
139 Talton v. Mayes 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896), discussed in text accompanying notes 193-
96 infra.
140 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
141 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (b) (1970) repealed section 7 of the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505,
67 Stat. 588. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321 '(a). 1332 (a) require the consent of the tribe before the
exertion of state jurisdiction.
142 Lazarus, Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill -of Rights, 45 N.D.L. Rxv.
337, 346-47 (1969).
143 A notable exception is an establishment clause. Whether an Indian tribe may impose a
single religion on all its members is, theoretically at least, an unsettled question.
144 For an early prediction of this problem see Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the
Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HAav. L. Rav. 1343, 1353-73 (1969).
145 Id.
146 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970).
147 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
148 White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
149 See Comment, Indian Law: The Application of the One-Man, One-Vote Standard of
Baker v. Carr to Tribal Elections, 58 MINN. L. Rnv. 668 (1974).
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to the extent it applies the Bill of Rights to tribal government. On balance, the
Act appears to be a holding action; while tribes are allowed to exist, the um-
brella provided by the Bill of Rights protects Indians and non-Indians from the
activities of tribal governments. It is in this holding pattern that Congress con-
tinues to operate.'
7. Summary of the Congressional Response
The congressional response to native Americans has changed with the tides
of history. In the early part of the nineteenth century, when Indian tribes were in
fact nations possessed of limited sovereignty, Congress preempted the field in
the early Intercourse Acts and dealt with the tribes by separation. As the
nineteenth century reduced Indians in fact from nationhood to the vanquished,
Congress encouraged the settlement of their land by non-Indians and the ultimate
assimilation of the Indian. By the twentieth century the Indian was a citizen
of the United States, and the tribe was a political subdivision of the Congress.' 5
Depending upon the prevailing attitudes of the decade, Congress either allowed
tribal self-government (the Indian Reorganization Act) or extinguished the
existence of the tribe as an entity (the termination legislation). Clearly, Congress
has absolute power over the existence of the tribe, and the states lack power over
the reservations within their boundaries only because and to the extent Congress
has not permitted it. In short, the use of the term "sovereignty" in connection
with an Indian tribe is wholly inaccurate as against the United States. As against
the states it is accurate only to the extent Congress preempts the field and permits
tribal self-government to the exclusion of state jurisdiction. The extent to which
the Supreme Court has been faithful to this principle is the next area of exami-
nation.
V. The Tribe in the United States Supreme Court
The effects of westward expansion and historical events are reflected in the
opinions of the Supreme Court which relate to Indian tribes. Because the status
of the tribe in the early nineteenth century was quite different in fact than its
status by the end of the century, early formulations by the Court were rapidly
eclipsed by reality, and later opinions reflect the shift.
A. The Early Formulation of John Marshall
Four cases written by Chief Justice John Marshall between 1810 and 1832
set the stage upon which Indian legal battles are now fought. These cases
150 For example, the most recent congressional legislation regarding the tribes is 25 U.S.C.A.
§ 450 et seq. (Supp. 1976) (Indian self-determination) and 25 U.S.C.A. § 1451 et seq.
(Supp. 1976). In order to raise the standard of living of tribal Indians, the latter Act creates
a loan and grant program to tribes and individual tribal Indians to assist in the establishment
of Indian businesses.
151 "Whatever the tribes' theoretical status in the 1830's, they were in fact not sovereign
by the end of the 19th century, as shown -by Congressional legislative authority over them."
Note, supra note 144, at 1347.
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were significant not because of the limited principles for which they stood, but
rather because of Marshall's expansive dicta. It must be recalled that these
opinions were written during the period in which the United States policy toward
Indian tribes was reflected in the Intercourse Acts: separation for eventual
subjugation with minimal friction.
Fletcher v. Peck.52 was the first case to reach the Court in which the rela-
tionship between the states, the tribes and the United States was at issue. The
buyer of real property within the boundaries of the state of Georgia sued his
seller for breach of covenants of title, alleging that the property in question had
been reserved by the British Crown for the use of Indians, and therefore the land
was acquired by the United States by the Revolutionary War, and not by
Georgia.' 53 The Court rejected this contention, and held that "the reservation for
the use of the Indians appears to be a temporary arrangement," and the land
so reserved was "within the state of Georgia."' 4 Accordingly, there was no breach
of covenant in the deed. The Court then raised the question "whether a state can
be seized in fee of lands, subject to the Indian title," and held that "the nature of
the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be
legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in
fee on the part of the state."' 55 The date of this case, 1810, may be crucial to
understanding the result. Between 1802 and 1813 no federal legislation existed
regulating affairs with Indians.' Accordingly, though the opinion does not so
state, no federal preemption was involved and the states were free to hold the
fee in lands reserved to tribal Indians. But this result is at odds with later formula-
tions by Marshall. Thirteen years later he would have held title in the United
States as a successor to the Crown's treaties. Fletcher was a slow start and would
later prove embarrassing to Marshall.
In Johnson v. M'Intosh,"5 ' the Court was asked to decide if an Indian tribe
could convey title to lands in America. Since the purported conveyances occurred
in 1773 and 1775, the Intercourse Acts' prohibitions against tribal transfer of land
without the consent of the United States5 8 were inapplicable; therefore, the
Court had to examine the nature of tribal sovereignty in the abstract. Chief
Justice Marshall traced the legal impact of European settlement, and concluded
that discovery gave title to the continent to the European nation which made
the discovery. 5 "[T]he rights of the original inhabitants... to complete sover-
eignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to
dispose of the soil at their own will ... was denied by the . . . principle that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it."'60 Therefore, the United
States holds title to the continent and has the "exclusive right to extinguish
152 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
153 Id. at 142.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 142-43.
156 Text accompanying note 55 supra.
157 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
158 See text accompanying note 47 supra.
159 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
160 Id. at 574.
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the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest."'' 1 Reflecting
the reality of the day, the Court said "[t]he title by conquest is acquired and
maintained by force" and "it is not for the Courts of this country to question
[its] validity."'
62
The Court noted that usually the conquered are allowed to be incorporated
into the conquering society, to "make one people,"' 63 "[b]ut the tribes of Indians
. . . were fierce savages,"' 64 so a different result was unavoidable. Finally, the
Court held that "Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants
. . . to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others."' 65
Johnson has since stood for the proposition that the United States is the sovereign
against whom Indian tribes have no standing as sovereigns. Five years later,
James Kent was to rely almost exclusively on Johnson in discussing Indian tribal
title to land in his Commentaries.'66 "It [the rule of Johnson] is the law of the
land, and no court of justice can permit the right [of the United States] to be
disturbed by speculative reasoning on abstract rights."'67
But Johnson appears to be wholly inconsistent with Fletcher. Somehow,
between 1810 and 1823 Marshall concluded that the fee to Indian tribal lands
was not in the states but, rather, in the United States.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,' the Cherokee Tribe brought a bill in
equity against the State of Georgia, seeking to restrain the state from executing
its laws in Cherokee lands.'69 The tribe asserted a right to be free of state law
arising out of a treaty between the United States and the Cherokees.
Chief Justice Marshall examined the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under article III of the Constitution. Unless the Cherokees were a foreign state
under article III, the Court had no jurisdiction and had to dismiss the bill. He
examined the unique relationship between Indian tribes and the United States,
and said that "[t]he Indian territory is ... a part of the United States... con-
sidered within the jurisdictional limits of the United States... .,"" Then follows
his often-quoted and now-famous dicta:
[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy,
be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which
we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point
of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in
a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian.' 7 '
161 Id. at 587.
162 Id. at 589.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 590.
165 Id. at 591.
166 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARES 307-19 (1st ed. 1828).
167 Id. at 310-11.
168 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
169 Id. at 15.




The Court, therefore, held that an Indian tribe is not a foreign state under
the Constitution,' 72 and buttressed its conclusion by the separate treatment ac-
corded foreign nations and Indian tribes in article I, § 8(3)."s Accordingly,
the Cherokees' bill was dismissed.Y
Up to this point, Marshall had fashioned two principles out of the state of
things: (1) Tribes could not convey their land of their own will, because the
fee was in the United States (Johnson) ; and, (2) tribes were not foreign nations
under the Constitution (Cherokee Nation). The question raised by the Cherokees
in Cherokee Nation, the extent to which a state has jurisdiction over tribal lands
within its boundaries, remained to be considered.
Worcester v. Georgia'75 presented this issue. A non-Indian citizen of
Vermont, a missionary, was convicted of violating a Georgia statute which pur-
ported to regulate who could live in Indian country. "[P]ower, war, conquest,"
said Chief Justice Marshall, "give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by
the world . ,,."" Hence, he proceeded on "the actual state of things."' 7  The
Court noted that treaties between the United States and the Cherokees guar-
anteed to the Cherokees the right of self-government.' It was within this con-
text that the Court said: "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory, . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, . .."" On this basis, the Court struck down Georgia's statute. State law
did not extend to Indian tribal land, not because of inherent tribal sovereignty,
but, rather, because the United States had by treaty guaranteed to the tribe the
power to govern themselves. Indeed, after Fletcher, Johnson, and Cherokee
Nation, there was little, if any, sovereignty left on which to base the decision.
This point has often eluded commentators and courts, and Worcester has been
inaccurately used to expand on notions of tribal self-government. Much of the
responsibility lies with Marshall, whose expansive discourse produced something
less than a tight opinion. But Marshall had good reasons for this. First, as a
political matter it was important to assert the preeminence of the Union over the
states.' Secondly, in 1832, the historical reality was that many tribes were
distinct political communities. Worcester was an attempt to assert the authority
of the Union against the states, not the sovereignty of the tribe against the states
or the United States, and any effort to read therein the latter proposition should
be dispelled by Fletcher (for the states) and Johnson and Cherokee Nation (for
the United States), as well as subsequent formulations by the Court.
172 Id. at 20.
173 Id. at 18. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
174 The Court saying, "[i]f it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater
are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the
future." 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20.
175 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
176 Id. at 543.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 556. See, e.g., the 1835 treaty with the Cherokees discussed in the text ac-
companying note 37 supra.
179 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
180 Indeed, after this decision President Jackson was reported to have said, "John Marshall
has made his decision; let him enforce it." FEY & MONICKLE, supra note 2 at 26.
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B. Subsequent Formulations of the Status of Indian Tribes in
Relation to the United States: 1850-1901
In this period, the Court used various stock formulations of the status of
Indian tribes,:8' ranging from the imprecise, 8 ' to the insulting.8 3 But three cases
deserve separate treatment.
In Ex Parte Crow Dog8 4 the Court noted that a federal statute had excluded
from federal criminal jurisdiction the murder of an Indian by an Indian on a
reservation. The case is frequently cited in support of tribal sovereignty. In
reality, however, the case merely restates the familiar principle that the juris-
diction of federal courts can be limited by acts of Congress.
Congress moved quickly to fill the jurisdictional gap and in United States v.
Kagazma 5 the Court was faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of the
statute. The Court said:
Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States. The soil and
the people within these limits are under the political control of the Govern-
ment of the United States, or of the States of the Union. There exist within
the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.'8 6
This language clearly precludes the possibility that an Indian tribe has a right to
self-government independent of a congressional grant. Not content to rest its
decision upholding the statute on article I, § 8(3), the commerce power, the
Court added that the statute was constitutional "because it [jurisdiction over a
reservation] never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is
within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes."' 87 In 1886,
the Court still suffered under a narrow view of the commerce power. No doubt
such a statute would be upheld today under the commerce power, but Kagama
reached the result by a tour de force. Its Constitutional premise was that
sovereignty exists only in the United States and the states. Since the state had no
jurisdiction, the United States had to have it. The Constitution permits no other
scheme. The conclusion is that tribal self-government exists only to the extent
the United States permits it to exist.
181 Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103 (1855) ("Whether the Cherokee people
should be considered . . . a foreign State .... The fact that they are under the constitution of
the Union . . . is a sufficient answer to the suggestion."); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
211, 242 '(1872) ("Indian tribes are States in a certain sense, though not foreign States, or
States of the United States .... "); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27 (1886)
("[Tihe Choctaw Nation falls within the description in the terms of our Constitution, not of an
independent state or sovereign nation, but of an Indian tribe. As such, it stands in a peculiar
relation to the United States.").
182 Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 374 (1850) ("The Cherokees are in many
respects a foreign and independent nation.").
183 Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (1901) ("The North American Indians
do not and never have constituted 'nations' . ... In short, the word 'nation' as applied to the
uncivilized Indians is so much of a misnomer as to be little more than a compliment.").
184 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
185 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
186 Id. at 379 '(emphasis added).
187 Id. at 384-85.
[April 1976]
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
Kagama's vitality was recently confirmed in United States v. Blackfeet
Tribe,'88 a case which dramatically demonstrates the contemporary status of
claims to tribal sovereignty. A federal statute prohibited slot machines on the
reservation.'89 The Blackfeet Tribe in Montana passed an ordinance permitting
slot machines. After an F.B.I. agent seized some machines, the tribal court issued
an order restraining all persons from removing the slot machines from the reser-
vation. A United States Attorney violated the order and was ordered to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt by the tribal court. The United
States Attorney then filed an action in the United States District Court seeking to
enjoin the tribe from proceeding with the contempt proceedings. In defense, the
tribe asserted its "sovereignty." The court said: "The blunt fact, however, is
that an Indian tribe is sovereign to the extent that the United States permits it to
be sovereign-neither more nor less."' 90 The court held that it was beyond the
power of the tribal court to limit a federal officer in the performance of his duties.
The court said it had sympathy for the judges of the tribal court because it under-
stood the pressures "generated by political urgings for the exercise of tribal
sovereignty."'' After citing Kagama, the court said:
Unfortunately the word "sovereignty" is politically used without regard
to the fact that as applied to Indian tribes "sovereign" means no more than
"within the will of congress."
92
The third Supreme Court case in this period warranting separate treatment
is Talton v. Mayes.'93 In it, a Cherokee Indian was indicted by a five-member
grand jury of the Cherokee Tribe for the murder of another Cherokee within the
reservation. He argued that the five-member grand jury violated the fifth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. The Court reasoned that since the Bill
of Rights was not applicable to the states, the fifth amendment was similarly not
applicable to tribes, because "its sole object [was] to control the powers conferred
by the Constitution on the National Government."' 9 With the subsequent ap-
plication of most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states, it is unlikely
that the case has continuing validity. Furthermore, the enactment of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968... has largely mooted the issue. But what the Court had
to say about the nature of the Cherokees' right to self-government is significant:
By treaties and statutes of the United States the right of the Cherokee
nation to exist as an autonomous body, subject always to the paramount
authority of the United States, has been recognized. 96
188 364 F. Supp. 192 (D. Mont. 1973), relitigated on a similar claim, 369 F.Supp. 562
(D. Mont. 1973).
189 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (1970).
190 364 F. Supp. at 194.
191 Id. at 195.
192 Id. In the later stage of the litigation, the court said that the United State has police
power on the reservation which is "not dependent upon specific constitutional grant and is
plenary," citing Kagam. 369 F. Supp. at 564-65.
193 163 U.S. 376 (1896), alluded to in text accompanying note 139 supra.
194 Id. at 384.
195 See text accompanying note 135 supra.
196 163 U.S. at 379-80 (emphasis added).
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The Cherokees' right to self-government had its origin in federal treaties and
statutes. But treaties, like statutes, can be repealed by the unilateral action of
Congress.
C. The Power of the Congress to Repeal a Treaty by Unilateral Action
In The Cherokee Tobacco... the United States had, by treaty in 1866,
exempted the Cherokee Tribe from federal taxes on the sale of farm products.
In 1868, in conflict with the treaty, Congress enacted a statute which imposed a
federal tax on, inter alia, tobacco. The Court recognized that the treaty and the
statute were in conflict, but concluded that a subsequent act of Congress super-
sedes a prior treaty.'9 8 To the same effect is Head Money Cases 9. in which the
Court held that a treaty is "subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its
enforcement, modification, or repeal.
200
In Stephens v. Cherokee Nation2"' a statute authorizing a commission to
determine citizenship in certain tribes as part of the general allotment plan was
attacked as violative of treaty provisions. The Court noted that the United States
"allowed" Indian tribes self-government by treaty.20 2 But it was clear that an
act of Congress can "supersede a prior treaty and that any questions that may
arise are beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance. ' ' Accordingly, the Court
upheld the statute.
At first glance, the power of Congress to abrogate a treaty by statute seems
awesome. Upon reflection, however, the need for this doctrine becomes apparent.
Surely the United States has the power to abrogate its obligations under inter-
national treaties. If it did not it would not be a sovereign. Moreover, there is
no constitutional limit on the power of Congress to repeal a treaty. 0 4 Congress
may be liable to pay damages under some provision of the Constitution such as
the fifth amendment, but there can be no doubt about its power to repeal a
treaty.
D. The Sovereign Immunity of the Tribe
One clue to the sovereignty of an entity is its power to exempt itself from
suit. Indian tribes do not, by themselves, have this power; Congress may autho-
rize suits against tribes. In United States v. U.S. Fidelity Co.,2"5 the Supreme
Court said:
These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional autho-
rization. It is as though the immunity which was theirs as sovereigns passed
197 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
198 Id. at 621.
199 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
200 Id. at 599.
201 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
202 Id. at 483.
203 Id., quoting from Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264,271 (1898). As to the status of Indian
tribes as political questions see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215-17 (1962).
204 For example, by its own terms, the contract clause is a limitation on the power of the
states, not the federal government.
205 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
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to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal properties did.20 8
The Congress has authorized suits against tribes. For example, most courts
which have been presented with the issue have held that the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 196820 is a congressional waiver of tribal immunity from suit.2 8
E. The Status of Tribal Land
1. The Early Formulation
At issue in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock"0 9 was a treaty between the United States
and the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes which provided for the allotment of tribal
land to individual Indians with the guarantee that no subsequent cession of
tribal land would affect the grant to the allottee unless approved by three-fourths
of the adult, male tribal Indians. When Congress enacted a statute which
affected the allotted land, the allottees claimed a taking in violation of the fifth
amendment. The Court denied a compensable interest in the allottee, even
though his interest arose out of a treaty.210 The Court noted that while Congress
might have a moral obligation to perform its treaty stipulations, "the legislative
power might pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians."
211
2. The Current Formula
There is no doubt that the United States can take tribal land as it can take
other land."'2 The real issue is whether compensation is due under the fifth
amendment. The answer depends upon whether the tribal claim is based upon
aboriginal possession 2" or Executive order, on the one hand, or congressional
grant, such as by treaty, on the other.
In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 21 " a tribe brought an action
against the United States seeking compensation for the taking of land given them
by Executive order. The Court said:
Where lands have been reserved for the use and occupation of an Indian
Tribe by the terms of a treaty or statute, the tribe must be compensated if
the lands are subsequently taken from then. 21 5
206 Id. at 512.
207 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970). Compare 25 U.S.C. § 450n (1).
208 Cases are collected in Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, 348 F.
Supp. 48, 50 (W.D. N.Y. 1972).
209 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
210 Id. at 564-66.
211 Id. at 566.
212 Except insofar as it is limited in taking the land of a State of the Union. U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 3(1).
213 "The power of Congress in [the extinguishment of Indian title based on aboriginal
possession] is supreme. The manner, method and time of such extinguishment raise political,
not justiciable issues.... And whether it be done by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the
exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise, its justness is
not open to inquiry in the courts." United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Ry., 314 U.S. 339, 347
(1941). (Douglas, J., wrote the opinion of the Court.)
214 316 U.S. 317 (1942).
215 Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
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But, because article IV, § 3 of the United States Constitution confers upon
Congress the exclusive power to dispose of property belonging to the United
States, tribes are "not entitled to compensation upon the abolition of an execu-
tive order reservation."21 The pattern begins to take shape. The United States
owns all the land that Indian tribes claim based upon their prior possession. It is
only when the Congress gives some land back to the tribe that compensation is
due under the fifth amendment upon a subsequent taking. Therefore, no com-
pensation is constitutionally due for the taking of tribal land held under claim
of aboriginal possession or by Executive order. Only Congress can give a tribe
a compensable interest in tribal land.
These principles were affirmed and defined with greater specificity in Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States," in which the Court said:
Where the Congress by treaty or other agreement has declared that there-
after Indians were to hold the lands permanently, compensation must be
paid for subsequent taking.
218
The Court said no particular form of congressional recognition is required, "but
there must be the definite intention by Congressional action or authority to ac-
cord legal rights, not merely permissive occupation."2 9 The Court traced the
conquest of tribes, noted that original Indian title was mere possession, not
ownership, and that original Indian title or occupancy can be terminated without
compensation. 2 ' The Court admitted that Indian tribal lands were taken by
force, and that their cessions were not real sales, but Congress had no legal duty
to compensate because "no other course would meet the problem of the growth
of the United States."22'
The Court noted that Congress established the Indian Claims Commission
to hear grievances even though it had no legal duty to do so.222 Finally, the
Court specifically limited and distinguished United States v. Tillamooks,2 1 in
which recovery was allowed by statute, but in which the language was am-
biguous and imprecise.224
Thus, an analogy between sovereignty and ownership of land is possible.
Just as a tribe derives its powers of self-government from the United States, so
too does it derive its claim to land. Prior powers of self-government and owner-
ship of land have no bearing on their present rights.
216 Id. at 330.
217 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
218 Id. at 277-78.
219 Id. at 278-79. And, the compensable interest is in the tribe, not the individual Indian.
United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80 (1972).
220 348 U.S. at 279, 285. For a recent case discussing Indian title, see Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
221 348 U.S. at 290.
222 Id. at 281-82.
223 329 U.S. 40 '(1946).
224 348 U.S. at 284-85.
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F. State Power Over the Reservations Within Its Boundaries
The extent to which a state can extend its jurisdiction to tribal reservations
located within its boundaries is the most common issue in contemporary Indian
law litigation. While the problem has already been alluded to,225 some general
observations are necessary before discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of
this state power. The Supreme Court has been as zealous to keep the states out of
reservations as it has been in asserting the plenary authority of the United States
over reservations. Some of this zeal is caused by the states' reluctance to accept
total federal preemption of the field. Some of it is caused by uncritical reliance
on dicta in Worcester v. Georgia22 6 in rapidly changing times. But in its zeal to
prevent state intervention, the Court has used language which holds out false
hopes for advocates of tribal self-government. Perhaps more importantly, the
quickness with which the Court has excluded states from asserting jurisdiction
over activities involving tribal Indians on the reservation has produced a patch-
work of jurisdictional anomalies resulting in there being whole areas of the
United States in which no forum exists for bringing a claim.
1. Early Distinctions
From the very beginning Worcester was rejected. Whether a state could
exert its jurisdiction over activities on a reservation depended upon whether the
actors were Indian or non-Indian. In The Kansas Indians227 the Court held
that Kansas could not tax tribal land because (1) the United States guaranteed
state tax exemption to the tribe by treaty, and (2) the tribe was to be governed
exclusively by the Union.22 8 The case, to be sure, could have been decided on
the first ground alone. But the year was 1866, and the Civil War was on the
minds of everyone. Accordingly, the Court buttressed its conclusion by quoting
John Marshall and referred to the tribe as a "people distinct from others. 229
Where the state sought to exert jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reser-
vation, the Court was more congenial. In Utah & Northern Ry v. Fisher23
the Court allowed the Territory of Idaho to assess a tax on non-Indian-owned
railroad property which passed through a reservation because "[t]he authority
of the territory may rightfully extend to all matters not interfering with" the
protection afforded the tribe by treaty.22 ' The Court said it would have per-





In United States v. McBratney,213 the Court held that Colorado had ju-
risdiction over a non-Indian who killed a non-Indian on the reservation. Though
225 See, e.g., Part IV (0) (5) supra, and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
226 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (discussed in text accompanying note 175 supra).
227 72 U.S. (5 WaHl. ) 737 '(1866).
228 Id. at 755.
229 Id.
230 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
231 Id. at 31.
232 Id. at 33.
233 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
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a treaty between the United States and the tribe called for federal jurisdiction,
the act of Congress admitting Colorado to the Union contained no such pro-
vision, and under the rule of The Cherokee Tobacco,"'4 the statute repealed the
treaty. McBratney was followed in Draper v. United States,"5 and more recently
in New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin,"6 where the Supreme Court said: "in the
absence of a limiting treaty obligation or Congressional enactment each state
had a right to exercise jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its bound-
aries."2 7 A broad reading of Martin would suggest that a state could exert its
jurisdiction over anyone or anything on a reservation except where prohibited
by treaty or statute. A narrow reading would limit the rule to non-Indians and
their property on the reservation. In any event, the broad exclusionary language
of Worcester (which itself dealt with a non-Indian) had by this time yielded to
the distinction between Indians and non-Indians. But this distinction does not
fit any of the nice categories of in personam jurisdiction.
2. The Development of the Current Formula: A Study in Confusion
Williams v. Lee. 8 begins the current development of a scheme by which
one can determine whether a state may assert its jurisdiction over persons,
property or events on a reservation. A non-Indian who operated a general store
on a reservation sued an Indian and his wife in an Arizona state court to recover
goods sold on credit on the reservation. The Court noted that time and history
had modified the principle of Worcester v. Georgia239 by allowing state law to
extend to reservations where "essential tribal relations were not involved."24 The
Court attempted to capsulize the jurisdictional scheme:
suits by Indians against outsiders in state courts have been sanctioned.
And state courts have been allowed to try non-Indians who committed
crimes against each other on a reservation. But if the crime was by or
against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on other
courts by Congress has remained exclusive .... 241
Then the Court fashioned a new rule, subsequently referred to as the "Infringe-
ment Test":
Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them.
242
Since no Act of Congress gave Arizona jurisdiction over a tribal Indian for a
claim arising on the reservation, Worcester applied and the state had no jurisdic-
tion.
234 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
235 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
236 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
237 Id. at 499.
238 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
239 31 U.S. '(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
240 358 U.S. at 219.
241 Id. at 219-20 (citations omitted).
242 Id. at 220.
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The reliance on Worcester was misplaced. In Worcester, a treaty pre-
empted state jurisdiction. In Williams the Court did not even look for a treaty
(though one existed). The result achieved was probably correct because of
treaty guarantees, but the language of Williams would later prove embarrassing.
The erosion of Worcester in Fisher,24 McBratney2" and Martin245 was to be
acknowledged within four years. In Kake Village v. Egan,4 the Court would
rely on Fisher and McBratney to disavow the statement in Worcester that an
Indian reservation is a distinct nation within whose boundaries state law cannot
penetrate. 47 The Court, instead, enunciated a new test whereby,
even on reservations state laws may be applied to Indians unless such ap-
plication would interfere with reservation self-government or impair a right
granted or reserved by federal law.
2 48
This test applies the Williams infringement test to Indians, a result made possible
by the imprecision of Williams. The Court would later retreat from this ap-
proach.
In Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission,45 it appeared
that the Court finally arrived at a: principled doctrine upon which to solve these
problems-the doctrine of preemption. The Court struck down an Arizona gross
sales and income tax levied on a trading post doing business on that portion of
the Navajo reservation in Arizona. Unfortunately, it is not clear in the opinion
whether the trading post was Indian owned or not. The Court held that the
state tax could not be imposed because "Congress has taken the business of
Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state
laws imposing additional burdens upon traders.' 250 The trading post hadbeen
licensed by the United States pursuant to a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme, which "left the State with no duties or responsibilities respecting the
reservation Indians."2 "1 This principled approach to state tax exemption based
upon federal preemption was to be short-lived. Indeed, the Court later surprisingly
denied that Warren Trading Post was a preemption case.252
The next serious effort at meeting these problems came in 1973.25' The
distinctions between "on the reservation" and "off the reservation" and between
Indian and non-Indian were finally incorporated into a new principled approach
to the problems of state jurisdiction in-two cases.
243 Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
244 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
245 New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 236 U.S. 496 (1946).
246 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
247 Id. at 72.
248 Id. at 75.
249 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
'50 Id. at 690.
251 Id. at 691.
252 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170 n.6 (1973), discussed
in text accompanying notes 266-69 infra.
253 Meanwhile, the Court had held that Public Law 280, discussed supra in the text ac-
companying note 131, had the effect of excluding state jurisdiction over a reservation Indian
for a claim arising on the reservation unless the state complied with the Act. Kennerly v.
District Court of Mont., 400 U.S. 423 (1971). This approach was available to the Court in
Williams, but went unnoticed.
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In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,25 the Supreme Court was confronted
with the validity of a New Mexico gross receipts tax imposed on a tribal ski
resort, located off the reservation, and a use tax imposed on personal property
purchased by the tribe outside of New Mexico and used at the resort. Instead
of blind reliance on Worcester, the Court finally realized that the proper approach
is to be found by examining relevant federal treaties and statutes.
[We reject . . . the broad assertion that the Federal Government has
exclusive jurisdiction over the Tribe for all purposes and that the State is
therefore prohibited from enforcing its revenue laws against any tribal
enterprise "[w]hether the enterprise is located on or off tribal land." Gen-
eralizations on this subject have become particularly treacherous. The
conceptual clarity of ... Marshall's view in Wordester v. Georgia, . . . has
given way to more individualized treatment of particular treaties and
specific federal statutes, including statehood enabling legislation, as they,
taken together, affect the respective rights of States, Indians, and the Fed-s
eral Government.
255
This methodology of rejecting generalizations in favor of reliance on treaties and
statutes comes as a great relief after the confusing generalizations spawned by
Wbrcester. Contrary to the blanket exclusion of state law over reservations in
Worcester the Court said:
even on reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application would
interfere with reservation self-government or would impair a right granted or
reserved by federal law.
25 6
But even this is the kind of generalization the Court warned against. Clarity
would have been better served had the Court simply said that state laws may
apply unless prohibited by treaty or statute. Since the resort in the case before
the Court was off the reservation, the comment was unnecessary to the decision,
and the following rule applied: "Absent express federal law to the contrary,
Indians going beyond reservation boundaries ... [and] off-reservation activities
are within the reach of state law."25 The Court found that the Indian Re-
organization Act, under which the resort was undertaken by the tribe, exempted
from state taxation land acquired under the Act. Since the personal property
was attached to the realty, the New Mexico use tax on it was invalid. But since
no similar express federal statute exempted the resort from a state gross receipts
tax, the New Mexico gross receipts tax was valid. 5 8
While Mescalero concerned itself with off-reservation activities by tribal
Indians, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission... involved a state's
attempt to tax the income of a tribal Indian whose entire income came from
reservation sources. First the Court pointed out that the case did not concern
254 411 U.S. 145 "(1973).
255 Id. at 147-48.
256 Id. at 148.
257 Id. at 148-53.
258 Id. at 158.
259 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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a nonreservation Indian, or non-Indians on the reservation, or reservation Indians
off the reservation (as in Mescalero).260 The Court held the tax invalid because
of relevant treaties and statutes, not tribal sovereignty." 1
[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as
a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption ...
The modem cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian
sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which
define the limits of state power.
262
The Court noted that Indian sovereignty as a doctrine was relevant only as a
backdrop against which treaties and statutes must be read.26 Federal pre-
emption of the field was such that the issue of residual Indian sovereignty was
moot.
64
Looking to the applicable treaties and statutes, the Court found that tax
exemption was inferred26 5 from both the Navajo treaty which set aside a reserva-
tion for Navajos only, and from Arizona's enabling Act which authorized it to
tax land "outside of an Indian reservation."2 66 The Court then attempted to
clarify the confusion caused by Kake and Williams by limiting Kake to non-
reservation Indians67 and Williams' infringement test to non-Indians.6 '
The significance of Mescalero and McClanahan lies not only in their bring-
ing some order to a confusing area, but also, and more importantly, in their crea-
tion of a realistic, principled approach to the various problems involving state
assertions of jurisdiction over reservation and nonreservation activities involving
both Indians and non-Indians. The result is that federal preemption, not tribal
sovereignty, insulates tribal Indians from state jurisdiction.269 The corollary, of
course, is that nothing protects tribal self-government "from the will of Congress
itself. 2 70
3. Jurisdictional Nightmare
Because of federal preemption, those states which did not avail themselves
of the consent of Congress to unilaterally assert their jurisdiction over Indian
reservations,27 - while such consent lasted, 2 frequently find themselves without
jurisdiction over reservation Indians for transactions arising on the reservation.
260 Id. at 167-68.
261 Id. at 165.
262 Id. at 172.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 172 n.8.
265 The Court invoked the canon of construction that doubtful expressions are to be in-
terpreted in favor of "the weak and defenseless people." Id. at 174. See Antoine v. Washing-
ton, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
266 411 U.S. at 176.
267 Id. at n.15.
268 Id. at 179.
269 See Comment, 49 WAsr. L. Rev. 191, 211-12 (1973); Note, Indian Regulation of Non.
Indian Hunting And Fishing, 1974 Wis. L. Rav. 499, 509-10.
270 Comment, 49 WAsH. L. Ryv. 191, 212 (1973).
271 See text accompanying note 131 supra.
272 See text accompanying note 141 supra.
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Yet, federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, and Congress has not relaxed
federal jurisdictional requirements coextensively with federal preemption. Ac-
cordingly, there are occasions involving non-Indians where only tribal courts have
civil jurisdiction.27 Many tribes, however, have not implemented forums to the
full extent of their jurisdiction. Other tribes, understandably, lack the capacity
or resources to indulge in a first-rate judicial system. Accordingly, there are claims
in the United States for which there are literally no forums and other claims for
which there are practically no forums.
Schantz v. White Lightning74 illustrates the problem. A non-Indian resident
of North Dakota, while driving through a reservation,275 was involved in an
automobile collision with a car driven by a tribal Indian.2 76 The North Dakota
courts had no jurisdiction over the non-Indian's claim against the Indian because
the tribe never granted its consent to the state to assert jurisdiction over the reser-
vation under 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1970). The tribal court, under the tribe's con-
stitution, had no jurisdiction over actions brought by non-Indians for claims
exceeding $300.00 The United States District Court had no jurisdiction because
(1) there was no diversity-both were residents of North Dakota, and (2) there
was no federal question-the tort of negligence does not arise under federal law.
The United States District Court dismissed the complaint of the non-Indian
expressing regret over the absence of any judicial forum to hear the case.277
Another anomaly created by federal preemption is that a court's jurisdic-
tion may very well depend on who sues first.27 For example, in the case above, if
the Indian sued the non-Indian in the state court, the state court would have
had jurisdiction. Hence, jurisdiction depends not on where the event occurred
so much as on the ethnic origin of the defendant.
Finally, the lack of a forum in which to bring a claim inures to the detriment
of the Indian as well. Sellers of goods and services are reluctant to extend credit
to tribal Indians for lack of tribal remedies. 9 In any event, the jurisdictional
void left by federal preemption is an area ripe for congressional remedy.
G. The Supreme Court, 1974-1975
One would have hoped that the Court would have maintained the
methodology employed by Mescalero and McClanahan (i.e., look to the treaties
and statutes) on a consistent basis. By and large, it has. But on occasion it will
fall back on the "separate entity" language of Worcester, where straightforward
treaty or statutory analysis would have done as well.
273 Between state and federal courts, criminal jurisdiction seems to be complete as to non-
Indians. See Comment, The "Right of Tribal Self-Government" and Jurisdiction of Indian
Affairs, 1970 UTAH L. Rav. 291, 298. But see, Ortiz-Barrazza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176
(9th Cir. 1975).
274 368 F.Supp. 1070 (D.N.D. 1973), aff'd, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
275 Driving through a reservation is a common daily event in many western states.
276 368 F.Supp. at 1070.
277 Id. at 1071.
278 See Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L. Rav. 206.




In Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida"' the Court held, with good
reason, that a tribal claim to possession of aboriginal land was sufficient to invoke
the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts. But in an effort to save
the Indian hiring preference provision of the Indian Reorganization Acte" the
Court, in Morton v. Mancari,"2 relied on "sovereign" language to describe the
preference granted to Indians. The Court referred to Indians "not as a discrete
racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.", 8" Indeed,
as to Indians as a group, the Court relied on article I, § 8(3) of the Constitu-
tion2 ' to say that "[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative
judgments will not be disturbed."2 Probably article I, § 8(3) would have
sufficed without resort to the "quasi-sovereign" language.
United States v. Mazurie288 is an unfortunate, if herculean effort, to uphold
a congressional delegation to a tribe of jurisdiction over non-Indian-owned land
within the reservation boundaries. The Court, relying on Worcester, said "Indian
tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory.12 87 It is unclear why the methodology and language
of McClanahan.. was not employed.
One inherent problem in this inconsistent approach to Indian law is the
disturbing practice of overruling or distinguishing cases shortly after they are
issued.2" In Mattz v. Arnett,"' the Court said that the language of allotment acts
does not terminate the reservation status of the land settled by non-Indians.2" '
Two years later, in DeCoteau v. District County Court," ' Mattz was emasculated.
H. Summary
Fluctuations notwithstanding, the net effect of Supreme Court treatment
of the role of the tribe in the federal system is that federal pre-emption, not tribal
sovereignty, insulates the tribe from state law, and that as to its relationship to the
United States, the tribe is a construct of Congress.
VI. Conclusion
The extent of sovereign power being, like the very existence of sovereignty,
a pure matter of fact, depends entirely upon the extent of the obedience
280 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
281 See note 96 supra.
282 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
283 Id. at 554.
284 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
285 417 U.S. at 555. See Gray v. United States, 394 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1968), noted in
82 HAuv. L. REv. 697 (1969), in which penalty provisions of federal statutes which varied
as to whether the victim was an, Indian or non-Indian were upheld.
286 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
287 Id. at 556.
288 Quoted in text accompanying note 262 supra.
289 See text accompanying note 224 supra.
290 412 U.S. 481 '(1973).
291 Id. at 497.
292 420 U.S. 425 (1975). Similarly, In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905) was overruled in




Largely through his own effort, the tribal Indian is no longer the forgotten
American.29 But his effort has raised the question whether his sui generis role
in the federal system can or should survive. It has been said that "to the extent
[the tribal Indian] asserts an inherent right of tribal self-government, [he] has
not truly manifested his consent to be governed wholly under the internal gov-
ernment set forth in the Constitution." '95 Many tribal Indians would heartily
agree with this appraisal. 9 ' The Constitution was not designed with tribes in
mind. Congress has been caught between changing tides of opinion running
from full separation to total assimilation, but neither is immediately achievable.
The reality is that the tribe cannot be separate, if only because historical forces
and the Indian's already achieved partial integration are irreversible.29 The
effort, then, must be to find some imaginative accommodation of tribal interests
in cultural identity consistent with the federal system and the near certain assimi-
Jation of the tribe in the future. Statehood as a solution has both constitutional,"'
and intrinsic problems. A state would have to open its borders to all Americans,
not just members of a tribe."'
The problem posed by the tribe is largely a question of policy, a function
of the legislative branch of government. But the failure of Congress to find a
solution to the problem of the tribe results from the lack of any consensus within
the Republic."' The solution must come, if at all, through the political process,
and the tribe should play a major role in it.
The Supreme Court's role should be limited. It should forthrightly deny
the existence of inherent tribal sovereignty (as it implicitly did in McClanahan
and Mescalero) and decide Indian law problems within the framework of
relevant treaties and statutes. A contrary conclusion would render the entire legis-
lative scheme unconstitutional, a reckless result. Allotment, termination, and
grants of jurisdiction could not pass muster if tribes had inherent rights to self-
government, with origins other than the Congress. A lack of residual tribal
sovereignty is already inherent in the Court's decisions. Whenever the Court has
293 Lowell, The Limits of Sovereignty, 2 HAsv. L. Rav. 70, 87 (1888). See Oliver, The
Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 Oo. L. Rav. 193, 203 (1959).
294 Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1818 (1968).
295 Note, Sovereignty, Citizenship and the Indian, 15 ARz. L. REv. 973, 1001-02 (1973).
296 See, e.g., Henderson & Barsh, Oyate kin hoye keyuga u pe, -ARv. L. SCHOOL BULL.,
April 1974 at 10, June 1974 at 10, Fall 1974 at 17.
297 See Note, supra note 294, at 1840.
298 Article IV, § 3(1) would prohibit the creation of a state out of the territory of an
existing state without the consent of the legislature of the state concerned. The tenth amend-
ment divides constitutional powers among the United States, the states and the people.
299 Recognized by Henderson & Barsh, supra note 296, at 19 (Fall 1974).
300 Consensus is difficult of achievement because of constant tension between conflicting
values. On the one hand, the tribe is a remnant of a nearly lost heritage, ani endangered specie.
Once extinguished, it cannot be revived. Moreover, diversity within a pluralistic society is a
positive value. On the other hand, the equal protection clause runs counter to the legal recogni-
tion of special status for one class of people. No other racial group has managed to achieve
legal protection of cultural identity in the public sphere. Equal protection forbids it. Other
groups have had to preserve cultural identity in the private sector. The Indians? claim to
exemption from this result, based upon article I, § 8(3), does not evoke a sympathetic response.
A fundamental policy choice must weigh these considerations.
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resorted to pat phrases involving "sovereignty" it has always been within the
context of the exclusion of state jurisdiction, a result readily obtainable under the
doctrine of federal preemption.
Litigation involving tribes will proliferate as the tribe asserts its jurisdiction
with greater confidence. Courts will not be misguided by the mystery which
surrounds the tribe's claim to sovereignty only if they adhere to a methodology
of looking to the relevant treaties and statutes.
